Nation building, the simultaneous allocation of economic aid and military assistance in conict and post-conict environments, has cost the world trillions of dollars over the last half century. Yet few attempts have been made to quantify the potential economic growth eects for the recipient country from the provision of this aid. While foreign aid potentially crowds out private investment during normal times, economic and military aid together may foster security and thereby encourage private investment during times of conict. Using a forty-ve year panel dataset, we construct a measure of nation building using a three-way interaction term between military assistance, economic aid, and conict regime. Considering that slow growing countries may be less likely to receive aid, we instrument for aid by estimating donor-to-donee aid ows using United Nations voting and colonial legacy histories. We nd that spending on nation building does have a positive eect on economic growth. Once conict ceases, however, we nd that continued military operations coupled with economic aid harms growth. The results hold whether a single country or a multilateral group performs the nation building operation. JEL Codes:F3,F4,O4
Introduction
Nation building has been an important element of foreign policy for at least a century.
Historians date the rst nation building operation conducted by the United States back to 1901, when the USS Thomas brought ve hundred teachers to Manila Bay with naval escorts to rebuild the Philippines.
1 While the extent and reach of nation building have varied with time, these operations have been a continual part of global aairs over the last half century, as Figure 1 indicates. Further, the United States has not been the sole initiator of nation building excursions. European nations have actively engaged in such operations throughout the Balkans, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. 2 As seen in Figure 1 , episodes peaked after two key historic events. The rst coincided with the end of the Cold War around 1992. Many hoped that worldwide peace would emerge from the ruins of the Soviet Empire. But as complex disputes broke out in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, the United Nations and individual countries were ready to step in with both force and civilian aid to mitigate these emergent humanitarian crises (Dobbins et al. (2008) ). By the late 1990's, many countries started to tire of nation building forays. In the U.S. during this time, many politicians actually built their campaigns around an anti-nation building platform. After the events of 9/11, perspectives swung back, and nation building became a prominent tool in the Global War on Terror.
The resurgence of interest in global stability and development after the terrorist attacks of This paper attempts to empirically measure the direct benets for the recipient country's development from nation building operations. Foreign aid of any sort has the potential to spur economic growth by increasing capital and/or productivity. During times of conict, however, growth can be severely impeded by violence and uncertainty. On the one hand, nation building (the joint provision of economic and military aid in conict or post-conict areas) may raise the eectiveness of aid by complementing economic assistance with military security. If military aid reduces uncertainty, a boost to capital or productivity from the simultaneous provision of economic aid may encourage private investment. On the other hand such robust foreign involvements may potentially crowd out private provisions or generate a crippling dependency which hinder growth prospects. The net growth eect of nation building eorts is thus an empirical question, one that surprisingly has not been addressed in prior literature.
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Studies have analyzed the growth eects of economic aid, military aid, or conict in isolation, but have yet to explore the simultaneous combination of all three. 6 Yamarik et al. (2010) show that conict negatively aects economic growth and the negative impact increases as a function of conict intensity. Imai and Weinstein (2000) delineate the specic ways in which civil war negatively aects growth. Caplan (2002) adds that conict harms less developed nations more than highly developed ones. Additionally, the magnitude of damage depends on the type of war being fought. Caplan (2002) nds that internal conicts, typically between a government and a rebel faction, cause greater damage than interstate conicts. Considering the negative impacts of conict on economic development, several economists have considered the potential benets of introducing foreign aid in post-conict environments. Collier and Hoeer (2002) create a model for analyzing foreign aid in post civil war situations.
Building upon the classic foreign aid model rst described by Burnside and Dollar (1997) , they show that aid impacts growth by the greatest amount during the four to seven year period following an internal war. Kang and Meernik (2004) show that a donor nation tends to provide long-lasting post conict economic assistance to nations to whom they previously 5 Creasey et al. (2012) analyze the growth eects of both aggregate economic/military aid and aid designates for particular projects. In the context of this framework, conict can potentially aect growth in several dierent ways. First, conict can outright destroy the current capital stock as evidenced by Imai and Weinstein (2000) . Additionally, the instability of conict can dissuade private investment, lowering new capital formation. The destructive nature of conict may also raise the depreciation of physical and/or human capital. Finally, conict can foster mismanagement and ineciency, cutting into the productivity of the economy. For these reasons, conict in general is likely to have a negative eect on economic growth.
Neoclassical theory further suggests that conict should be temporarily disruptive to growth (see Easterly et al. (1993) ). That is, wars waged domestically can disrupt production and depress investments. Once the conict ends however, the fundamentals of the economy are restored, and the recovery phase should bolster growth as productive activities recommence and infrastructure is rebuilt. We thus consider conict and post-conict treatments as variables that inuence the speed of convergence of an economy to its steady-state, but not the steady state itself.
We wish to explore the interactions between dierent conict scenarios and dierent types of aid. These interactions can either speed up or slow down a nation's convergence to its own steady state. As in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995) , one can log-linearize and rst dierence the steady state equation from the Solow model in order to empirically construct a panel growth regression. In addition to including the fundamental variables of growth, one may include other auxiliary explanatory factors (Durlauf and Quah (1998) ). Our empirical strategy is to include measures of conict and post-conict periods, economic aid, military assistance, and their interactions, along with the fundamental variables that are standard in neoclassical growth theory.
Military intervention alone can help foster a secure environment, potentially encouraging higher savings rates and lowering both physical and human capital depreciation (Jones and
Kane (2007)). Such intervention could however cause further disruption to the local economy and thus slow down growth. Similarly, dierent types of aid during conict or post-conict may help or hinder a country's transitory dynamics. This aid may help replenish a war-torn nation's stock of capital, or it may crowd out local private investments. Finally, economic aid and military assistance together may act as compliments that provide both funding for local projects and security to allow those projects to succeed. On the other hand, joint assistance may simply crowd out each type of aid or other forms of investments, or foster a dependency that further stagnates the economy. In summary, the net eects of joint aid projects during or after conict is an empirical question, to which we now turn.
Empirical Estimation
To gauge the growth eects of nation building, we augment the neoclassical growth model to incorporate conict, military assistance, and economic aid variables.
Following Durlauf and Quah (1998) , a standard Solow model augmented with human capital can be estimated with panel data using the following equation:
where b 0 = µ j + κ t represents country and time specic eects in country j during time period t.
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Consistent with the Solow model, we include initial GDP levels (lny j )to capture the idea that growth depends on a country's distance from its steady state. Considering that each country may have a unique steady state, we include the determinants of steady state: savings rates for physical capital (s k ), savings rates for human capital (s h ), and population growth rates (n). The growth span, T , is set to 3 year increments in order to isolate the long run growth eects versus annual business cycle eects, suggested by Islam (1995) and Collier and Dollar (2002) .
The impacts of nation building are captured in the following framework:
where: analyze the eects of conict on growth, or to study growth convergence in general (Islam (1995) (2008) . This data set records all instances of military interventions over international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states. The military assistance variable, an indicator variable, records any instance when one or more of the twenty-two OECD nations acts as a third party intervener. This includes military interventions to assist a nation during a domestic dispute, to protect a socio-ethnic minority or faction, to help combat terrorists 9 This is a convention used by Collier and Hoeer (2002). or rebels, to protect economic interests during a conict, to provide humanitarian aid, to further an ideological issue, or to promote diplomatic goals. Therefore this variable encompasses a broad spectrum of types of military aid. Essentially it captures any military action performed by one country within another country's territorial borders for reasons other than waging war. This denition indicates that the host nation does not necessarily have to request or accept the military assistance. An intervention that involves multiple OECD nations codes as a single intervention. Additionally and separately, we also record instances when the United Nations acts as a third party intervener.
A data set including every nation building operation from 1960 to 2005 does not exist.
Here we combine data from the sources mentioned above to construct measures of nation building activities for a wide range of country participants. 10 For our measures three criteria determine the incidence of nation building. First, nation building can only occur during a conict or post-conict period as we have dened. Second, the country must receive economic aid from a foreign public source. Finally, some external military assistance must simultaneously be provided. The specicity of this denition causes the omission of certain observations that some may consider to be de facto nation building. this operation resembles an attempt at nation building, the countries involved did not provide economic aid to Lebanon, so this episode is also not considered a nation building initiative.
While this denition of nation building is fairly strict, our data document over 200 separate episodes during conict periods. Figure 2 identies the locations of initiatives that satisfy our denition of nation building.
Estimating aid ows
Inherently, economic aid data has a potential selection bias that is likely to cause an endogeneity issue. That is, countries that experience major economic diculties, and therefore anemic growth, are more or less likely to receive economic aid in the rst place. An instrumental variables approach can help solve this endogeneity problem, where bilateral aid ows are rst estimated and then used as instruments in the main regression. Following Alesina and Dollar (2000), we regress the total aid given by a donor country to a recipient country in a particular year on both political anity and colonial ties. Political anity captures the notion that countries are more likely to donate to countries that are like-minded. 11 This political ally variable is proxied using UN voting-similarilty in a given year between the donor and potential aid recipient (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2008) 12 . For colonial linkages, an indicator variable is used to capture current and passed colonies and the number of years of this colonization history. We extract this colonial history from the CIA Factbook. Predicted aid amounts are then aggregated and logged to produce a measure of predicted aid, which is then used as an instrument in the growth regressions.
11 Also see Barro and Lee (2005) for discussion of IMF loan provision. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signicant at 1% * * * , signicant at 5% * * , and signicant at 10% * . T = three-year span data. Year eects not reported.
Conict, Aid, and the Eects of Nation Building
We augment the baseline models with measures of conict and post-conict periods, economic aid, military assistance, and their interactions. The results are reported in Table 2 in columns to be addressed, and we do so below. The interactions between military assistance and conict regimes also yield some interesting insights. Periods when the country is in conict and is receiving military assistance appear to be particulary low growth periods. On the other hand, the presence of military assistance during those times just following the conict are strongly associated with more rapid growth.
We are also interested in combinations of these interaction terms. Specically, we wish to gauge the marginal growth eects of nation building. That is, what is the marginal impact of an extra dollar of economic aid (economic aid jt ) when there is also military assistance (military aid jt = 1) and the presence of conict (conict jt = 1)? Going back to the notation from equation (3.2), this requires testing the simple linear restriction θ 3 + θ 4 + θ 9 + θ 10 = 0.
Using parallel logic, assessing the marginal impact of post-conict nation building, we test the linear restriction θ 3 + θ 5 + θ 9 + θ 11 = 0.
Results of interaction tests are reported in Table 5 . We can condently reject the null on both counts. More specically, using our estimated nation-building measure during conict, a 1% increase in economic aid during times of conict and military assistance translates into a roughly 2.5% increase in growth. On the other hand, using our estimated nation-building measure during post-conict, a 1% increase in economic aid with military assistance after conict translates into a roughly 2.2% decrease in growth. This suggests that nation building endeavors do help with economic growth, but that once the conict is over persisting in nation building activity harms growth.
The analysis above raises a number of questions. The primary issue of course is endo-geneity. All the variables used to construct our nation building measures are potentially endogenous with economic growth. Perhaps the thorniest relationship is that between economic aid and growth, as many studies suggest that aid tends not to be doled out in low growth environments, and these are perhaps more prone to conicts. Are nation building activities primarily conducted in high-growth countries or regimes, or conducted mainly in those regions already most likely to succeed? If so, we are potentially giving too much credit to economic and military aid in bolstering growth during times of conict. Similarly, do these types of assistance measures tend to persist in more troubled countries or regimes once the conict is over? If so, we are potentially not giving enough credit to nation building endeavors in post-conict scenarios. Our use of country xed-eects can help address some but not all of these concerns.
Instrumenting Economic Aid
We perform a two step estimation procedure to avoid potential endogeneity concerns surrounding the provision of economic aid. 13 Often aid is provided for geopolitical considerations (as opposed to strictly economic considerations). Therefore, we use such geopolitical factors as instruments for aid ows. Alesina and Dollar (2000) , who use colonial histories and political alliances to determine foreign aid, were the rst to instrument for aid ows using cultural or political variables.
In a similar manner to Alesina and Dollar (2000) , we estimate bilateral aid ows using two types of geopolitical variables. The rst measures the extent to which two countries are politically alligned. The data captures roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 -2008 (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2008 . 14 From this Gartzke (2010) creates an anity index which provides a metric reecting the similarity on voting positions of pairs of countries. 15 The intent in using this index is to capture the idea that aid donors may generally prefer to contribute resources to like-minded regimes, or that aid may be used to punish or reward regimes for voting in particular ways (Carter and Stone (2010) ). Alesina and Dollar (2000) and others posit that past colonial relations can be a strong motivator for current aid giving. The second type of variable, therefore, measures the colonial relationships between country pairs, capturing the number of years the aid giver has or had 13 However, to address concerns that military intervention may also be subject to similar endogenity problems, in appendix A we apply a similar two-stage procedure to predict military intervention. The results closely echo our other qualitative ndings.
14 Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379 UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1 [Version] 15 Erik Gartzke, "The Anity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in the UNGA" been a colonizer of the aid receiver. This colonial history is constructed using data from the CIA World Factbook. Since this approach produces many observations with a zero observed for the dependent variable (most country-pair year observations will not have any aid ows),
we estimate a Tobit model to address the censored nature of aid measures.
4.2.2
An IV approach to Nation Building Given the discussion above, our rst step is to estimate the following:
where:
aid hjt = aid amount from OECD member h to recipient country j. x 1,hjt = political anity measure between countries h and j. x 2,hjt = former colonizer indicator between aid giver h and receiver j. x 3,hjt = current colonizer indicator between aid giver h and receiver j. x 4,hjt = number of years former colonizer h had colonized j (since 1900).
x 5,hjt = number of years current colonizer h has colonized j (since 1900).
Note that we include β h to show our control for OECD-donor xed eects.
Results from this estimation are presented in Table 3 . Echoing the ndings of Alesina and Dollar (2000) , the similarity of voting behavior between two nations is a positive prediction of aid giving and/or receiving. Colonial legacy also can help predict aid patterns, although this relationship appears to slightly deteriorate over time.
Using the results from regression (4) in Table 3 , we sum the estimated aid ows across potential OECD donors for each recipient nation. We can then replace our original aid measures with the sum of our estimated measures.
A comparison of results when we instrument for aid ows and when we do not is presented in Table 4 . First note that the coecient on our instrumented aid variable dramatically falls to insignicance, validating the concerns of some researchers that aid may ow to already relatively successful regions. However, note that during periods of conict, our instrumented measure of aid is positively associated with growth. This gives us a fortiori evidence that economic assistance has indeed helped war torn regions grow faster than they otherwise would.
Again, we are interested in the potential growth eects of nation building both during periods of conict (testing if θ 3 + θ 4 + θ 9 + θ 10 = 0 from (3.2)) and during periods after conict (testing if θ 3 + θ 5 + θ 9 + θ 11 = 0 also from (3.2)). Results from these exercises are provided in Table 5 . Qualitatively, they echo the results from the non-instrumented version.
Specically, using our instrumented measure of aid, a 1% increase in aid during times of conict and military assistance is associated with a 1.39% increase in growth. This is a weaker but arguably a more accurate measure of the positive eects of nation-building aid compared to our non-instrumented results. On the other hand, a 1% increase in aid with military assistance after conict translates into roughly a 4.6% decrease in per capita income growth. This negative result is in fact much stronger than in the non-instrumented case. Our conclusions thus remain consistent. Joint assistance during times of conict helps economies grow; the same kind of assistance when the conict is over hinders recovery.
Given that we do not instrument for conict regimes and military assistance here, can we hang our hats on these results? We argue yes. First, as noted above, conict itself is strongly negatively related to growth; if anything this potentially biases our estimated eect of nation building during conict periods downward. As for military assistance, it is possible that such help only comes to countries already with strong growth potential. However, our results in Table 2 suggest that this is unlikely -military assistance during conict periods also is strongly negatively related to growth. Thus we would argue that our estimated positive growth eects of nation building funds during conict periods are fairly conservative.
However, to address concerns that military intervention may also be subject to similar endogenity problems, in Appendix A we apply a similar two-stage procedure to predict military intervention. The results closely echo our qualitative ndings here.
We can use similar logic to argue over the negative inuence of nation building funds in post-conict regimes. Both post-conict periods and military assistance during these periods are associated with faster growth. Going back to Table 4 , we observe strong positive growth eects. The fact that economic aid (instrumented or not) coupled with these factors seems to produce lower growth would suggest that nation-building funds themselves thwart growth.
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An interesting question is whether economic and military aid tend to complement each other, or if they tend to crowd each other out. In the context of this study, this is similar to inquiring over the sign of post − conf lict jt = 0), there seems to be no relationship between combined economic and military aid and per capita growth ( θ 9 is insignicant). However, the conict environment does seem to matter here. F-tests of θ 9 + θ 10 suggest that the simultaneous allocation of economic and military assistance during conict has positive eects on growth (although this result is insignicant in the instrumented case). This may indicate some complementarities in assistance meaning that economic aid is more eective in conict environments when it is buttressed with military assistance that can provide security. Tests of θ 9 + θ 11 , on the other hand, imply that such joint assistance after conicts may harm economic growth. This indicates a type of crowding out in that economic support may stymie the natural forces of post-conict growth.
There are important normative implications in this. Naturally there are many reasons why one nation may wish to provide assistance of some form to another nation. In matters of per capita growth, however, the argument seems to be that a conict-riddled nation is best served by a combination of military and economic support. After the conict, a persisting military presence helps growth further; economic aid however should pull out and allow private growth forces to reemerge on their own.
Unilateral v. Multilateral Nation Building
Finally, we wish to explore a bit further the eects of dierent types of military interventions.
As we suggested earlier, dierent groups conduct nation building for dierent reasons, and these dierences may translate into dierent eects on economic development. Are there dierent growth eects from military aid provided by a single player compared with joint assistance from a multitude of countries? Dobbins et al. (2008) argue that multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations, may have a dierent approach to nation building than single country actors, and consequently may have dierent growth eects. On the one hand, interventions by individual countries may be quite weak, particularly since domestic pressures may preclude anything but a tiny military force to be sent abroad. As such the growth eects of nation building considering these interventions may appear quite modest. On the other hand, risk averse countries may wish to execute multilateral military excursions in particularly dicult environments, where the probability of success is already low. In this case multilateral nation building operations would likely have worse growth eects than unilateral operations.
So far we have considered military aid provided by either a single country or a multitude of countries as the same. Now we separately consider military interventions by only one of the twenty-two DAC nations (`unilateral') and joint interventions by two or more nations ('multilateral'). We will also consider UN mandated peacekeeping operations, which are altogether separate cases and may denitionally be considered an alternative measure of multilateral intervention. Treating dierent kinds of military interventions separately also allows us to further explore endogeneity issues, as each type of military force may be motivated by dierent considerations. Table 6 displays the results of estimating (3.2) when we treat the military aid indicator separately for unilateral interventions, multilateral interventions and U.N. peacekeeping interventions. Table 7 shows results from the same exercise when we also use the instrumented economic aid measures described in section 4.2.2. Results generally echo those produced in the baseline case. Specically, military interventions during times of conict tend to have a negative association with growth ( θ 7 ), while military interventions during post-conict periods tend to have a positive association with growth ( θ 8 ). And the interaction term between economic aid, military intervention, and post conict scenarios ( θ 11 ) is negatively associated with growth, no matter how military intervention is measured.
Finally, we can consider the conditional marginal eects of economic and military aid using these dierent measures of military interventions the same way we do in Table 5 .
Results of these exercises using the estimates displayed in Table 7 are shown in Table 8 .
Again considering our measures of the eects of nation building, we see that economic aid in the presence of military aid and conict ( θ 3 + θ 4 + θ 9 + θ 10 ) suggests higher economic growth (although the results are fairly weak). On the other hand, economic aid in the presence of military aid after conict ( θ 3 + θ 5 + θ 9 + θ 11 ) unambiguously suggests lower growth. In fact multilateral post-conict nation building appears worse for growth, and economic aid during U.N. intervention seems particularly bad for growth in post-conict scenarios. Yet the marginal growth eect of military involvement when economic aid is present in post-conict environments ( θ 6 + θ 8 + θ 9 + θ 11 ) is positive, and these results are stronger for multilateral interventions.
What to make of these estimates? We submit that these results echo our earlier suggestions. Nation building operations during conict can bolster economic growth. Following conict however, such robust foreign intervention can be damaging to recovery. A strong multilateral peacekeeping force should maintain security to allow growth to recover. At the same time economic aid should be curtailed to allow domestic investment to reemerge. This is particularly true in the presence of a multilateral peacekeeping force, as such military aid may substitute for economic aid. Table 6 are used.
Conclusions
Nation building operations occur for many varied reasons, including attempting to promote security and stability of strategic regions, thwarting the spread of terrorism or nuclear weapons or abhorrent ideologies, protecting natural resource stockpiles, and promoting democracy. This paper suggests that policy makers should consider the inuence on economic growth and development as an important by-product of these endeavors.
Overall this analysis has shown that during conict nation building can help to increase the economic growth rate of a host nation. The eects are not terribly strong, and not statistically signicant in all specications. Still, they suggest that a robust intervention of economic and military support may help an economy in the grips of war. Once the conict concludes, the analysis suggests that growth prospects are strongest with continued military support and receding economic aid. Excessive aid can in fact hinder the natural rebuilding phase of a post-conict nation. Studies which nd no evidence that aid helps countries grow suggest that policy makers need to rethink the entire apparatus of aid (Rajan and
Subramanian (2008)). We suggest that an approach that simultaneously considers conict and military aid is a fruitful part of such a rethink.
6 References augment our instrumented framework to include an instrumented measure of military aid to demonstrate that our ndings are robust to this issue.
Our rst step is to use Logit estimation on the following:
Our explanatory variables are those used in (4.1) which measure political anities and colonial histories between country-pairs:
x 1,hjt = political anity measure between countries h and j. x 2,hjt = former colonizer indicator between aid giver h and receiver j. x 3,hjt = current colonizer indicator between aid giver h and receiver j. x 4,hjt = number of years former colonizer h had colonized j (since 1900).
These variables once again capture factors which do not directly inuence growth but do inuence international assistance, this time measured as the incidence of military intervention.
Note that again we include β h to show our control for military-intervener xed eects.
Results from this rst stage are posted in Table 9 . As with our rst stage estimating economic aid, past or current colonial history are strong predictors of aid. In this case, prior or current colonizers militarily intervene in old or current colonies with greater propensity.
Interestingly, similar voting records in the U.N. correspond to less military intervention. This does make some sense, since potential nation builders may nd that the most expeditious way to achieve political ends is through coercive means.
The distribution of estimated probabilities of military intervention by country h into recipient j is displayed in Figure 3 (these correspond to the estimates from regression 4).
As in our rst-stage estimation for bilateral aid ows, we must aggregate these to produce a measure for each potential recipient nation. But how we aggregate is not quite as straightforward, since estimates in this case are probabilities. We thus choose two extreme methods of aggregation to produce two alternative indices: We then re-estimate our original nation-building framework using our original instrument for economic aid and (separately) our two new alternative instruments for military aid:
where: results using our military aid index from (A.3) are stronger, results from both exercises support our original ndings. These marginal impact measures are not quantitatively comparable to those in Table 5 (since in that case military aid was measured as an indicator variable and not as a probability index), but the qualitative directions are the same. From tests of θ 3 + θ 4 + θ 9 + θ 10 = 0 and θ 3 + θ 5 + θ 9 + θ 11 = 0, we echo our conclusions that nation-building during conict promotes growth, while post-conict nation-building endeavors stie growth.
Further, the evidence still suggests the presence of complementarities between military and economic aid during conict periods, and potential crowding-out eects between these aid types directly after conict.
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